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SECTION 1983 LITIGATION- SUPREME COURT
DEVELOPMENTS
Martin A. Schwartz *
Section 1983' is a vital part of American law because it is the
statute that enables the courts to enforce the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment against state and local officials. At the
same time, Section 1983 litigation is typically very complex; it is
quite multifaceted. It seems to generate an almost endless stream
of new issues and nuances. The Supreme Court's decisions from
last term dealing with Section 1983 litigation illustrate the
potential range of issues that can arise in litigation of a Section
1983 case.
I would like to list, as a starting point, the subject areas of last
term's Section 1983 decisions. First, there were two cases dealing
with subject matter jurisdiction, specifically, removal jurisdiction.
Second, there was a major decision dealing with substantive due
process in the context of a high-speed police pursuit, County of
Sacramento v. Lewis.2 Third, there was a prosecutorial immunity
* Professor Martin A. Schwartz is highly accomplished in the field of § 1983
litigation and, among other things authored a leading treatise entitled Section
1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (3d ed. 1997) and Section 1983
Litigation: Federal Evidence (2d. ed. 1995). In addition, Professor Schwartz is
the author of a monthly column in the New York Law Journal, entitled "Public
Interest Law." Professor Schwartz has also been the co-chair of the Practicing
Law Institute Program on § 1983 litigation for over fourteen years.
The author expresses appreciation for the valuable assistance of Adam
Kleinberg in the preparation of this article.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This section provides in part that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. See generally 1A, 1B, IC MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. MRKLJN,
SECTION 1983: CLAIMs AND DEFENSES (3d ed. 1997).
2 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).
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decision, determining when a prosecutor is entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity. Fourth, there was a decision dealing with
absolute legislative immunity. Finally, there was a major decision
last term dealing with qualified immunity.
It is interesting to think about the decisions of last term in the
Section 1983 area as a group, because, on the one hand, they seem
to have a law school flavor. Many of them look like they could
easily end up being the questions that appear on a final exam,
which is not meant to be a hint for students. On the other hand, in
sharp contrast to that cerebral quality of the decisions, they also
have a real life litigation aspect to them; they deal with very
practical issues that come up in the Section 1983 area. I think that
they are reflective of the fact that the United States Supreme Court
is beginning to understand some of the real life litigation problems
that district court judges and attorneys face when they embark on
the litigation of a Section 1983 case. As I go through the
decisions, you will see what I mean about this duality, the law
school flavor and practical flavor at the same time.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Let us start with the first category, subject matter jurisdiction.
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over Section 1983
claims pursuant to the general federal question statute.3 It is also
resolved at this point that state courts have current jurisdiction over
Section 1983 actions
If a Section 1983 claim is brought in a state court, the question
arises as to whether the defendant is able to remove it to a federal
court.' Removal jurisdiction may not strike you as being a thrilling
issue, however, this issue is actually very important because the
plaintiff, for some strategic reason, chose the state court forum.
Now, if the defendant has the right to remove the case from state to
federal court, the defendant can effectively take away the choice of
forum, which originally was lodged with the plaintiff. So, despite
3 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 35-37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)(3) (1994) (providing for an alternative source of
federal court subject matter jurisdiction over Section 1983 claims).
4 See IA SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61.
5 See generally Martin A. Schwartz, Supreme Court and Civil Rights Removal
Decisions, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 1998, at 1.
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the procedural, technical aspect of the issue, this is something that
becomes of strategic importance. If the Section 1983 claim is the
only claim in the state court complaint, the state action is clearly
removable to federal court.6 It is removable to federal court
because federal statutory authority allows the removal of state
court actions that could have been brought in federal court in the
first instance.'
Removal complications arise when the state court complaint
asserts not only a Section 1983 claim, which is a federal cause of
action, but also asserts some other claim. For example, the
plaintiff may also assert "pendent" state law claims, or a claim
which, if it had been asserted in federal court, would be barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.' The lower federal courts have had a lot
of difficulty in dealing with these types of issues. The United
States Supreme Court last term dealt with both situations.
Let's take the first situation, a Section 1983 claim filed in state
court together with a state law claim. You can very easily think
about this situation in New York. Let's say, for example, that a
complaint is filed in New York Supreme Court asserting a
constitutional claim under Section 1983 and a judicial review
claim under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules? The question arises whether that state complaint is
removable to federal district court.
The United States Supreme Court last term had a similar case
which came out of the Seventh Circuit, City of Chicago v.
International College of Surgeons.0 In City of Chicago," the
United States Supreme Court held that when a state court
complaint alleges a federal constitutional claim under Section
6 See 1A SCHVARTZ, supra note 1, at 55-58.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1997). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1997)
(authorizing removal of claims arising under federal law).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment states in pertinent part:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State." Id.
9 Under New York law, an action may be consolidated with a special
proceeding, such as an Article 78 proceeding. See DAVID D. SEIGEL, NEW
YORK PRACTICE 195 (2d ed. 1991).
'0 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
11Id.
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1983, along with an Article 78 judicial review state law claim, the
state complaint is removable to federal district court. 2 You may
still think that does not sound too exciting, but the dissenters in the
case described the majority opinion as being a "watershed
decision," and a "landmark result."' 3  What were they thinking
about? Why were they describing the majority decision in such
extreme terms? The thinking was that the function of state court
review of administrative agency action has historically and
traditionally been a function of the state courts, and that is what
state courts have been doing forever. Here, the United States
Supreme Court is saying that federal courts are empowered to
adjudicate judicial review claims that historically and traditionally
have been viewed as primarily, if not solely, the function of state
courts.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the position of the
Seventh Circuit. 4 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that deferential
judicial review of agency action is akin to appellate review, and
thus not within the powers of the district courts, which are courts
of original jurisdiction. The circuit court concluded that a state
judicial review proceeding is not a "civil action" within a district
court's "original jurisdiction" under the removal statues, and thus
could not be removed. 5
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected that
reasoning. 6 The majority reasoned that if the Section 1983 claim
was the only claim, clearly it could have been removed from state
to federal court. 7 The judicial review claim comes within what we
used to refer to as pendent jurisdiction, but now refer to as
supplemental jurisdiction, under the federal supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 42 U.S.C. Section 1441 (a). The Supreme
Court held that the judicial review claim, arising out of the same
12 Id. at 167.
'" Id. at 167-70 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined Justice
Ginsburg's dissenting opinion.
14 Id. at 162. See also International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 91
F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 1996).
's 91 F.3d at 990. The circuit court ordered remand to state court. See also
City of Chicago, 91 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 1996).
'a522 U.S. at 169.17 Id. at 164.
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basic set of facts as the Section 1983 claim, is a claim that comes
within the supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts."8
The Court made two important points about supplemental
jurisdiction. 9 First, the supplemental jurisdiction statute applies
equally to cases removed to the federal courts as it does to cases
that have been originally filed in federal court.' That is important
because it is a holding of first impression from the United States
Supreme Court. Additionally, the Court said that the supplemental
jurisdiction statute "codifies" the principles of power and
discretion developed under the decisional law previously covering
pendent jurisdiction.2
However, the fact that the district court has supplemental
jurisdiction over the state judicial review claim does not mean that
the court is obligated to exercise that jurisdiction. The district
court has discretion to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction.'
That is going to be an essentially ad hoc case-by-case analysis by
the district court judge.
The other thing that could happen to the supplemental claim is
that the district court might find that the claim invokes one or more
of the abstention doctrines. ' Again, the mere fact that the claim is
removable to federal court does not guarantee that the federal court
is actually going to hear the judicial review claim.
The other case dealing with subject matter jurisdiction and
removal was Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht."'
In Schacht, the state court complaint asserted a Section 1983 claim
against a state official, seeking monetary relief against the official
in his personal capacity.' Additionally, the complaint asserted a
second claim, which was within the scope of the Eleventh
'
8 1[d.
19 See generally SCHvARTZ, supra note 3, at I
20 City of Chicago, 118 S. Ct. at 533.
21 Id. at 530. See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
22 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (1994).
23 See SCHiWARTZ, supra note 3, at 3.
24 118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998). The Supreme Court granted certiori in Schacht to
resolve the conflict of whether a case consisting of one claim that is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over the
entire case. Id.
25 See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (holding that personal capacity
claims are not barred by Eleventh Amendment).
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Amendment, meaning that the claim would be barred by state
sovereignty immunity.26 The United States Supreme Court held
that even when a state court claim might be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, that does not bar the removal of the state complaint
from state court to federal court, and the federal court can assert
removal jurisdiction over the non-barred claim.27 In this case, it
would be over the personal capacity claim.
This decision is important because it resolves a split in the
circuits.28 Some circuit courts, inclhding the Seventh Circuit, took
the position that the presence of even one claim that is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment deprived the federal courts of removal
jurisdiction over the entire case.29 Other circuits, however, have
held that the presence of a claim barred by the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar removal of the present action."
The United States Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's
position. Schacht held that the Supreme Court can hear the non-
barred claim; the claim that was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment was remanded to the state court.3'
One thing that is interesting about that opinion is that the Court
relied upon the fact that the Eleventh Amendment gives the state
only a potential defense. Thus, we do not really know that, what
we are calling "the barred claim," is in fact going to be a claim
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because the state might
choose not to assert its Eleventh Amendment defense. 2 Maybe the
state would rather defend the case on the merits. I think that this is
all true as a matter of legal theory, but the reality is that state
waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity are few and far
between.
2. Substantive Due Process
Let me move to the second area, substantive due process.
Individuals, who sue under Section 1983, usually attempt to seek
26 Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2051.
27 id.
28 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 4.
29 Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2051 (describing the Seventh Circuit's decisional
law).
30 See id. (describing the conflict in the circuits).3 1 id.
32 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 4.
864 [Vol 15
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protection under some specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights,
such as free speech,33 freedom of religion,' Fourth Amendment,"
and so forth. In a fairly substantial number of cases, however,
individuals who feel aggrieved by state and local governmental
action are unable to find protection in the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, and may seek to get protection from what they think
is arbitrary, sometimes even oppressive, governmental action
under the general doctrine of substantive due process.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has made very
clear its feeling on this issue. The Court has come out and
expressed its distaste, one might even say disdain, for the doctrine
of substantive due process." The Court has given two main
reasons. First, the doctrine does not find any support in the text of
the Constitution, it talks about due process, it does not talk about
any type of substantive protection?' Second, the Court has said
that it does not feel that it has sufficient standards or guidelines to
enable it to engage in responsible decision making when there is a
claim of substantive due process.38 It is quite clear that substantive
due process is not a favored doctrine in the United States Supreme
Court.39
This theme of negativism was expressed again last term in the
case of County of Sacramento v. Lewis,40 where the Court was
dealing with high-speed police pursuits. Let me set forth the facts
briefly. These are very tragic facts, but they do not lead to a
constitutional remedy. In Lewis, two deputy sheriffs pursued a
speeding motorcycle operated by an eighteen-year-old named
Brian Willard.4 Phillip Lewis, a sixteen year old, was a passenger
33 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34 Id
3 5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36 See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1993).37 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
38 Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992). "As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted
area are scarce and open-ended." Id. at 125.39 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998).40 id.
41 Id. at 1712. See also Martin A. Schwartz, The Decision on Police Pursuit,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 20, 1998, at 3.
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on the motorcycle. The two deputy sheriffs made numerous
attempts to get the motorcycle to slow down and stop.4  The
pursued vehicle did not stop, and the speed escalated to a point
where the deputy sheriffs were pursuing the motorcycle at a speed
of one hundred miles per hour.43 The chase ended when the
motorcycle driver, Willard, tried to make a sharp left turn and his
motorcycle tipped over." The driver of the motorcycle, Willard,
was able to get out of the way, but Lewis was not, and the deputy's
patrol car crashed into Lewis. Lewis was propelled 70 feet as a
result of the impact. He was pronounced dead at the scene of the
accident.4" Lewis' parents and his representatives brought suit in
federal court under Section 1983. They claimed that the police
pursuit violated Lewis' right to substantive due process,
specifically the right to life.46
They asserted a substantive due process claim with full
awareness of what this doctrine is all about. But it was the only
constitutional claim they had. Why do I say that? They could not
assert a Fourth Amendment violation 47 because they would have
had to show there was a "seizure," and they were unable to show
that the police pursuit brought about a seizure of Lewis.48 Why?
Because when you go to the Supreme Court's definition of
"seizure," the Supreme Court holds that "a seizure occurs only
when the governmental action terminates an individual's freedom
through means that were intentionally applied. 49  This police
42 id.
43 id.
44Id.
45 id.
46 id.
47 U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in
pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
48 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (1998).
49 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). In Brower, Justice Scalia
stated that a seizure only occurs when governmental action terminates an
[Vol 15
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pursuit was not a means that was intentionally designed to bring
about an accident that would result in the death of Lewis. So there
was no Fourth Amendment claim. There was no support for the
plaintiff's claim in any specific text of the Bill of Rights, so the
plaintiff relied upon substantive due process.
The critical issue in this case was the proper substantive due
process standard for evaluating the constitutionality of high-speed
pursuits. If one follows the decisional law in this area, there has
been, all over the country, a proliferation of cases like this. In this
case, it was the innocent passenger on the motorcycle who was
killed. In other cases, sometimes it was a by-stander, someone in
an other vehicle, or somebody who is just minding his or her own
business. I say a "proliferation" of these cases all over the country,
except New York City. Maybe because of New York City traffic
you just can't have high-speed pursuits in New York City.
The Supreme Court said that the governing substantive due
process standard was whether the police officer's pursuit was
shocking to the conscience. " That raised the next question; what
is going to shock the conscience? The Court says, "only a purpose
to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will
satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience
necessary for a due process violation."'" That means, in a case like
Lewis, the plaintiff has to show that the police officer acted with
the purpose to cause harm. I think that standard is so rigorous, and
I think what I am saying is an understatement, that very few
plaintiffs' lawyers in high-speed pursuit cases are going to file
substantive due process claims. How is the plaintiff going to be
able to show that the officer engaged in this pursuit acted with a
individual's freedom through means intentionally applied. A seizure would
result if a police officer intentionally rams his patrol car into a suspect's car.
However, a seizure would not occur if a "pursuing police car unsuccessfully
sought to stop the suspect only by the show of authority represented by flashing
lights and continuing pursuit, but accidentally stopped the suspect by crashing
into him." See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 3.
so The Lewis Court observed that the "shocks the conscience" test was first
formulated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and was applied in
Rochin to conduct by police officials "with full appreciation of... the brutality
of these acts." 118 S. Ct. at 1718 n.9.
51 Id.
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purpose to cause harm?52 Typically, it is a tense situation, that is
rapidly evolving, it happens very quickly, and the police officer
has to make a split-second decision. How is the plaintiff ever
going to show that this police officer acted with purpose to cause
harm? It is not enough to show the officer made an unwise, foolish
or even stupid decision. The plaintiff must show that the officer's
purpose was to harm the pursued driver.
That means plaintiffs will have to turn to state law for protection.
I looked to see what the New York law is, and it turns out that it
does not give the plaintiffs much in the way of protection either.
In New York, the standard that the plaintiff has to show is that the
pursuing police officer acted with a reckless disregard for the
safety of others.53 The New York Court of Appeals made it clear
that that is something more than a negligence standard. 4 So that is
going to be pretty tough, maybe not quite as tough as purpose to
cause harm, but still a very rigorous standard. That gives the
officer a lot of protection.
The decision in the Lewis case is an important decision beyond
the context of high-speed police pursuits, because the Court made
some very significant statements concerning the meaning and the
application of substantive due process.55 The Lewis Court ruled
that substantive due process differs depending upon whether the
plaintiff is challenging legislative action as opposed to executive
action.56 This is the first time that the United States Supreme Court
has drawn this distinction. Taking it a step further, this is the first
time that the United States Supreme Court has declared that the
shocks the conscience standard is limited to challenges to
executive action, enforcement of the legislative policy, and that it
is a different approach if the plaintiff is challenging the
constitutionality of the legislative policy itself.57
52 See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 3.
53 The New York Court of Appeals has interpreted Vehicle and Traffic Law
Section 1104 to mean that a police pursuit "may not form the basis of civil
liability to an injured bystander unless the officer acted in reckless disregard for
the safety of others." Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494, 501 (1994).
54 Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1718.
55 See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 2.56 Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1716.
57 Id. at 1724 n.2. "The proposition that 'shocks-the-conscience' is a test
applicable only to executive action is original with today's opinion . . ..
868 [Vol 15
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The Court gave as an example the physician assisted suicide case,
Washington v. Glucksberg 8 In a case challenging legislative
action, the key substantive due process issue is whether history and
tradition support the recognition of an implied fundamental
constitutionally protected right that would justify some type of
heightened standard of judicial review.59 The Court did not say
this but, if there was no such justification for an implied
fundamental constitutionally protected right, then the substantive
due process inquiry is whether the legislative policy is reasonably
related to the governmental issue.' It is not a shocks the
conscience inquiry.
The second important thing that the Court said about substantive
due process is, with respect to the executive action, different types
of executive actions call for different kinds of shocks the
conscience evaluation or analysis.6' The Court said that deliberate
indifference is an appropriate measure of whether official conduct
is conscience shocking when, but only when, actual deliberation by
an official is practical. The court gave as examples the adoption of
the deliberate indifference standard in cases involving the
provision of medical care to an arrestee.'2 In that situation, if the
official does not deliberate at all, or if the official deliberates in
such a slip-shod fashion that it's virtually no deliberation, that
official conduct is shocking to the conscience. On the other hand,
if you have a case like Lewis, where an official does not have a
realistic opportunity to deliberate, and must make a split-second
decision, then it is not appropriate to apply the deliberate
indifference standard. In that situation the court should inquire
whether the official acted with a purpose to cause harm. The court
had made similar rulings in prior cases, but this is the first time the
[Although pleased] to accept whatever limitations the Court... is willing to
impose upon the shocks-the-conscience test . . . it is a puzzlement why
substantive due process protects some liberties against executive officers but not
against legislatures." Id.
58Id. at 1717. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
59 Id.
60 See SCHNVARTZ, supra note 3.611d. at 1716.
62 See City of Revere v. Massachusetts, 463 U.S. 239 (1983). See also
Schwartz, supra note 41, at 3.
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court has put it all together, and I think it is going to have a big
impact in future litigation.
The Court is saying that when an official has to make a
governmental decision without any realistic opportunity to
deliberate, the substantive due process standard, which starts out
being very protective of the official, becomes even more
protective. Once again, a purpose to show harm is normally
impossible to show.
3. Prosecutorial Immunity
Let me move to the third category, prosecutorial immunity.
There are officials, like prosecutors, whom, because of the special
nature of the function they carry out, are given absolute immunity
from personal liability.63 The prosecutor, is only given absolute
immunity for carrying out the prosecutorial function. 6' In other
words, it is a functional approach. For example, a prosecutor's
decision whether or not to prosecute is part of the advocacy
function and prosecutorial function. Here, the United States
Supreme Court says the prosecutor is given absolute immunity."
Preparation for trial and the actual prosecution of the case are also
parts of the advocacy function and the prosecutor is absolutely
immune from liability.
When we discuss absolute immunity, what does it mean to be
absolutely immune? Are prosecutors immune from liability for a
malicious or even an egregious wrongdoing? Yes, so long as the
prosecutor was engaged in the advocacy function. If the
prosecutor steps outside the role of advocate and engages in an
investigatory or an administrative function, the United States
Supreme Court says that absolute immunity does not apply.66
63 See 1B SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at § 9.8.
64 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtrnan, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1986), Where the United
States Supreme Court determined that prosecutors are absolutely immune from
Section 1983 monetary liability when their activities are "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Id.6 5 id.
6 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2615 (1993), where all the
justices agreed that absolute immunity does not cover a prosecutor's statement
at a press conference. There was no immunity at common law for a prosecutor's
statements to the press as they are not part of the prosecutor's advocacy function
and they are not closely related to the judicial process. Id.
870 [Vol 15
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Sometimes, the function in which a prosecutor is engaged is
obvious. However, sometimes it is difficult to figure out. In some
cases, you need to determine if the prosecutor acted more like a
detective or a police officer. If so, there is no absolute immunity.
However, if the prosecutor was acting more like an advocate, she
is entitled to absolute immunity. Sometimes, this is a very close
call.'
In last term's prosecutorial decision, Kalina v. Fletcher,s the
prosecutor commenced a criminal proceeding, and did so by
preparing and filing three documents - an information, a motion
for an arrest warrant and a sworn certificate in support of the
motion for a warrant that summarized the evidence in support of a
criminal charge. 9 The United States Supreme Court found the
preparation and filing of the information as well as the preparation
and filing of a motion for the arrest warrant to be part of the
advocacy function. However, the Court ruled that the third
document, the sworn certificate that summarized the evidence and
swore to the accuracy of the information, was not part of the
advocacy function.7 That action taken by the prosecutor is akin to
the conduct of a complaining witness, and complaining witnesses
are not entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983. They
did not have immunity under common law, and they do not have
absolute immunity under this statute either.'
This is very interesting for two reasons; one, if you had asked
somebody to study this issue before this case had come down, it
would seem advocates prepare sworn statements all the time. They
put together facts and draft affidavits. Attorneys do prepare
affidavits as part of the advocacy function.
The other interesting thing about this is that the Court separated
the prosecutor's function for purposes of immunity analysis.' The
Court could have looked at what the prosecutor did as one
package, the advocacy package. However, it did not do that. It
67 See SCHVARTZ, supra note 1, § 9.8 (distinguishing between advocacy and
nonadvocacy functions).
68 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997).
69 Id. at 505.
70 Id. at 507.
71 Id. at 509-10.
72 Id. at 508. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
73Kalina, 118 S. Ct. at 508.
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looked at each activity separately. This has a significant impact on
real life litigation. When district court and circuit court judges
review questions of prosecutorial immunity, Kalina v. Fletcher
suggests that the judge must evaluate each activity separately in
order to determine whether the official is entitled to absolute
immunity.74
4. Legislative Immunity
The other absolute immunity decision, Bogan v. Scott-Harris,75
involves legislative immunity. The plaintiff, Janet Scott-Harris
was an administrator of the City of Fall River, Massachusetts,
Department of Health and Human Services. Reading between the
lines, they did not like her very much. The local legislative body
enacted an ordinance eliminating the Department of Health and
Human Services, which abolished her position.7" The plaintiff
filed suit in federal district court under Section 1983 against a city
council member, the mayor who signed the ordinance into law, and
the City. She alleged that the City's elimination of her position
was racially motivated and in retaliation for having exercised her
First Amendment rights in filing a complaint against a fellow
employee who had served temporarily under her supervision."
The Supreme Court in Bogan held that the legislative activities of
these local officials, voting in support of the legislation, and
signing the legislation into law, were protected by absolute
legislative immunity." Even though it was alleged to be racially
discriminatory and a violation of free speech, it was protected by
absolute legislative immunity.
Three main points come out of this decision. First, local
legislative officials are entitled to the same absolute immunity for
their legislative acts as state legislative officials.79 This was an
74id.
" 118 S. Ct. 966 (1998).
76 Id. The Mayor, Daniel Bogan, proposed budget-cutting measures for the
1992 fiscal year, including the elimination of 135 City positions. "As part of
this package, Bogan called for the elimination of DHHS, of which [Ms. Scott-
Harris] was the sole employee." See Martin A. Schwartz, Absolute Immunity for
Local Legislators, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1998, at 3.77 Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 969.
78 Id. at 973.
79
Id. at 970-72.
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issue upon which the United States Supreme Court had never
spoken before in the past, a ruling of first impression.
The second important ruling in Bogan is that absolute legislative
immunity covers the legislative acts of legislative officials and
the motive, intent, good or bad faith of the official is irrelevant."O
If it is a legislative activity, it is covered by absolute legislative
immunity, and we are not concerned with whether the official may
have had an unconstitutional motive.8 This is important, because
the district judge submitted the question of discriminatory motive
and the question of retaliatory intent to the jury. The United States
Supreme Court said it was error to submit those questions to the
jury because they are irrelevant to the legislative act immunity
defense.'
The third important issue in Bogan was whether a vote to abolish
a position is a legislative act? The Supreme Court said yes.' First
of all, it was legislative procedurally; it went through a legislative
process. Second, even though the action by the legislative officials
only affected one individual, it could still be legislative because
abolishing a position and setting budgetary priorities was part of
the policy making process. Even though the decision to abolish the
position only affected Ms. Scott-Harris immediately, it had
prospective implications, because other people could not apply for
this position.
It would be different if the local legislative body wanted to get rid
of Ms. Scott-Harris and fired her instead of abolishing her position.
Absolute legislative immunity would not apply because hiring and
firing is an administrative action, and only qualified immunity
applies in that situation." The lesson here is, if a local legislative
body wants to get rid of a particular public employee, the way to
do it is to abolish the position altogether rather than keep the
position and fire the employee. I do not know if there are any
limits to that. What if they abolish the position and the next day
they create a new one? I do not know. I expect that is probably
going to happen at some point.
'
0 Id. at 973.
8 Id. at 972-73.82 id.
83 Id.
84See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
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5. Qualified Immunity
Let me get to the last issue, qualified immunity. 5 Most officials
are not entitled to assert absolute immunity, they are only entitled
to the lesser-qualified immunity.16 I think that qualified immunity
is the most important issue in Section 1983 litigation. It is
certainly the most important defense. I say that because it resolves
a very high percentage of Section 1983 cases.
The key issue in qualified immunity is whether the official
violated clearly established federal law. If a public official sued
under Section 1983 violated the plaintiffs federally protected
rights but did not violate clearly established federal law, she is
protected from personal liability. However, if you have an official
being sued under Section 1983 who, not only violated federal law,
but violated clearly established federal law, she will not be
protected. The United States Supreme Court described qualified
immunity as a type of fair notice standard, which may be a good
way to look at it.87 If the law at the time of the alleged wrong is
not clearly established, the official could not be said to "know" that
the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.88
The Supreme Court has said in a number of cases this qualified
immunity defense is not only an immunity from liability, it is
actually an immunity from having to defend the case at all.8 Now
if you want to give the official immunity from having to defend the
case, the immunity defense should be decided by the district judge
as early in the litigation as possible." The defense should be
decided pre-trial or even pre-discovery, and decided as a matter of
law. Typically, the expectation is the immunity defense will be
raised on motion for summary judgment. The thinking is that, if
85 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 9.13.
861d.
87 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
88 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, § 9.16, at 355.
89 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (finding that qualified
immunity provides not merely an immunity from liability, but an "immunity
from suit" as well, meaning an immunity from the burdens of trial and often
even from pretrial discovery).
90 Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534, 536 (1991) (holding that because qualified
immunity is an immunity from suit and not just from liability, it should be
resolved "at the earliest possible stage in litigation").
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the case goes very far down the road, the official loses the
immunity from the burden of defending the suit.
A major issue over the years has arisen as to how the qualified
immunity defense should be handled when the plaintiff's
constitutional claim implicates the motivation of the defendant
official.9 For example, on a claim of racial discrimination, the
plaintiff has to show that the defendant acted with discriminatory
intent.92 Subjective intent is brought into play by virtue of the
nature of the constitutional claim. Or, if you have a First
Amendment retaliation claim, the first issue was whether the
defendant official acted with intent to retaliate against the plaintiff
because the plaintiff chose to exercise free speech rights. 3
This First Amendment retaliation problem was before the court
last term in Crawford-El v. Britton.' How do you implement
qualified immunity when you have a First Amendment retaliation
case? Initially, the court recognized the tension between the nature
of the constitutional claim and the nature of the qualified immunity
defense. The constitutional claim that is being asserted places the
defendant official's motive or intent in issue, and, typically, that is
going to present a question of disputed fact.95 The official is
unlikely to say, "I made this decision because I don't like blacks"
or "I did this to the plaintiff because I don't like people who speak
out." That is very rarely the case. On the other hand, the qualified
immunity defense is an objective reasonableness standard, which
the court says should be decided as a matter of law, and the
official's subjective intent does not matter.9 You have this
tension.
The lower courts became concerned that the plaintiff might
simply allege retaliatory motive or discriminatory intent, and the
fear was, by the mere allegation, the plaintiff would be able to
move the case into the discovery stage and maybe into the trial
stage. Once the plaintiff is able to do that, then this whole notion
9' See Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity Reality, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18,
1998 at 3.921d. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
93 See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).
94 118 S. Ct 1584 (1998).
9 Id.96 id.
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of immunity from suit is pretty much out the window. To prevent
plaintiffs from being able to engage in this type of strategy, the
lower federal courts started to impose what you might think of as
high procedural hurdles upon plaintiffs.97 Some courts said
plaintiffs had to file a heightened pleading; some courts imposed a
heightened production burden to defeat the summary judgment
qualified immunity motion. The plaintiff would have to come up
with strong evidence even at the summary judgment stage.
One of the most extreme examples of what was going on in lower
courts was what happened in the Crawford-El case. The D.C.
circuit court held that, in a First Amendment retaliation case, in
order to defeat the public official's summary judgment motion
asserting qualified immunity, the plaintiff had to produce clear and
convincing evidence that the official acted with a wrongful
motive.98 It was the only court in the country that had done this.
The question for the United States Supreme Court was the validity
of the D.C. circuit court rule. In a five to four decision, the court
held that the rule was invalid.9 The court gave three main reasons
for its decision. First, the rule is not authorized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."° The court held that the federal courts
have no business rewriting the federal civil procedure rules. If we
are going to have new procedural rules, they should come about
through the legislative process, not judicial imposition. Second,
the majority of the justices thought this rule imposed an unfair
burden on plaintiffs. It might operate at summary judgment to
deprive plaintiffs who might have meritorious claims of the ability
to get to the discovery and trial stages.'" Third, the court felt that
the existing procedures are adequate to protect the defendant
against an insubstantial allegation of retaliatory motive.02 The
bottom line is that when you have a claim asserted under Section
1983 that implicates the public official's motive or intent, the
qualified immunity defense raised on summary judgment should be
97 See Schwartz, supra note 91, at 3.
98 Crawford, 93 F.3d at 813. The en banc court produced five separate
opinions. Id.
9 523 U.S. 574 (1998).1°° Id.
'
0 1 Id.
102 Id.
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handled in the normal summary judgment manner. The district
court should follow normal summary judgment rules.
The decision in Crawford-El is filled with numerous procedural
details. It is all in the opinion, but I would stress the broad
discretion that the district judge has in managing pre-trial
discovery in this type of situation. The opinion reads like a manual
for federal district court judges. I do not know about you, but if I
am a litigator, I want to know what is in that manual. Normally,
those manuals are secret or you have to pay a lot of money to get
it. This manual is right there. I recommend that anybody who
litigates these types of claims read the manual. It requires very
careful reading.
I think what is most significant about the decision in the
Crawford-El case, is that it marks the first time that the United
States Supreme Court has treated and applied qualified immunity
in a realistic litigation fashion. It is the first time the court has
recognized that if you want to figure out whether the defendant
violated clearly established federal law, you first have to know the
facts. What were the facts? On one version of the facts, there
might not be a violation of clearly established federal law. On
some other version, perhaps there might be. So those facts have to
be resolved. If the facts are in dispute, there are no two ways about
it, they have to be resolved, even if it takes discovery and a trial to
resolve them.
Prior to Crawford-El, the United States Supreme Court acted as if
district judges could magically make these disputed factual issues
disappear so that the qualified immunity defense could be decided
early in the litigation as a matter of law." I think Crawford-El
marks a shift from qualified immunity magic to qualified immunity
reality, I hope the lower courts get the message. Thank you very
much.
103 See Schwartz, supra note 91, at 3.
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